A response to "Libertarianism and pollution: the limits of absolutist moralism"

In Arguments for Liberty: A Libetarian Miscellany. Buckingham, England: The University of Buckingham Press. pp. 155-159 (2016)
Authors
J. C. Lester
London School of Economics
Abstract
Most self-identified libertarians unwittingly have a moral muddle without a central factual theory of liberty. They cannot yet see that they first need to sort out what liberty is, and therefore entails if instantiated, and only after that can moral questions about it be coherently raised and tackled.
Keywords libertarianism  pollution  absolutist moralism  Zwolinski
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