Analysis and decomposition in Frege and Russell

Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):195-216 (2002)
Michael Dummett has long argued that Frege is committed to recognizing a distinction between two sorts of analysis of propositional contents: 'analysis', which reveals the entities that one must grasp in order to apprehend a given propositional content; and 'decomposition', which is used in recognizing the validity of certain inferences. Whereas any propositional content admits of a unique ultimate 'analysis' into simple constituents, it also admits of distinct 'decompositions', no one of which is ultimately privileged over the others. I argue that although Russell accepts this distinction between analysis and decomposition, Frege does not. In particular, I consider claims which Dummett makes regarding how 'analysis' and 'decomposition' are related to two different models Frege at least suggests in discussing the composition of thoughts, the part/whole model and the function/argument model; and I argue that in each case, while Russell accepts views which Dummett attributes to Frege, Frege does not
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DOI 10.1111/1467-9213.00262
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References found in this work BETA
Peter T. Geach (1975). Names and Identity. In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), Mind and Language. Clarendon Press. pp. 139--58.
Harold T. Hodes (1982). The Composition of Fregean Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 41 (2):161 - 178.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bjørn Jespersen (2015). Should Propositions Proliferate? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):243-251.
Carlo Penco (2003). Frege: Two Theses, Two Senses. History and Philosophy of Logic 24 (2):87-109.

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