Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (2):359–384 (2008)
Defenders of pragmatic theories of knowledge (such as contextualism and sensitive invariantism) argue that these theories, unlike those that invoke a single standard for knowledge, comport with the intuitively compelling thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason. In this paper, I dispute this thesis, and argue that, therefore, the prospects for both “high standard” approach, and contend that if one abandons the thesis that knowledge is the norm of assertion and practical reason, the most serious arguments against it lose force.
|Keywords||Analytic Philosophy Contemporary Philosophy Philosophy of Mind|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
The Express Knowledge Account of Assertion.John Turri - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):37-45.
Knowledge and Assertion.Jessica Brown - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):549-566.
Expert Opinion and Second‐Hand Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):492-508.
Assertion and Practical Reasoning: Common or Divergent Epistemic Standards?Jessica Brown - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):123-157.
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