Concepts about agency constrain beliefs about visual experience

Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):875-888 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent research exploring phenomena such as change blindness, inattentional blindness, attentional blink and repetition blindness has revealed a number of counterintuitive ways in which apparently salient visual stimuli often go unnoticed. In fact, large majorities of subjects sometimes predict that they would detect visual changes that actually are rarely noticed, suggesting that people have strong beliefs about visual experience that are demonstrably incorrect. However, for other kinds of visual metacognition, such as picture memory, people underpredict performance. This paper describes two experiments demonstrating that both these overpredictions of change detection, and underpredictions of visual memory can be linked with intuitions about the visual experience of different kinds of agents. Subjects predicted more visual change detection and poorer visual memory for mechanical representational systems when these were anthropomorphized using intentional terminology

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Agency and the A-Series.Roman Altshuler - 2009 - Southwest Philosophy Review 25 (1):153-161.
Seeing, acting, and knowing.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):999-999.
Egocentric Spatial Representation in Action and Perception.Robert Briscoe - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):423-460.
Intersubjectivity and Receptive Experience.Rebecca Kukla & Mark Lance - 2014 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):22-42.
Two Dogmas of Coherentism.Daniel Kalpokas - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 85 (1):213-236.
Is Seeing Believing?David Hilbert - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:446 - 453.
The admissible contents of visual experience.Michael Tye - 2009 - Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
On not giving up the world - Davidson and the grounds of belief.Jeff Malpas - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (2):201 – 215.
Visual experience.Scott Sturgeon - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (1):179-200.
A neo‐stoic approach to epistemic agency.Sarah Wright - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):262-275.
The Nonconceptual Content of Experience.Tim Crane - 1992 - In The Contents of Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-57.

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-12-18

Downloads
32 (#429,625)

6 months
4 (#315,466)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?