Color and color experience: Colors as ways of appearing

Dialectica 60 (3):269-282 (2006)
Abstract
In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By treating color as a relational property, a way of appearing, the three constraints can be met. However, serious problems for this view emerge when considering the relation between illusory color experiences (particularly hallucinations) and veridical color experiences. I do not propose a solution to these problems.
Keywords Color  Epistemology  Experience  Pain  Physicalism  Sentience
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DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2006.01056.x
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References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
The Compositionality Papers.Jerry A. Fodor & Ernest Lepore - 2002 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Openness of Illusions.Louise Antony - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):25-44.
A Puzzle About Colors.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):321–336.

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