Dialectica 60 (3):269-282 (2006)
In this paper I argue that color is a relational feature of the distal objects of perception, a way of appearing. I begin by outlining three constraints any theory of color should satisfy: (i) physicalism about the non-mental world, (ii) consistency with what is known from color science, and (iii) transparency about color experience. Traditional positions on the ontological status of color, such as physicalist reduction of color to spectral re?ectance, subjectivism, dispositional- ism, and primitivism, fail, I claim, to meet all three constraints. By treating color as a relational property, a way of appearing, the three constraints can be met. However, serious problems for this view emerge when considering the relation between illusory color experiences (particularly hallucinations) and veridical color experiences. I do not propose a solution to these problems.
|Keywords||Color Epistemology Experience Pain Physicalism Sentience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Color Realism and Color Science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
Citations of this work BETA
Transparency of Experience and the Perceptual Model of Phenomenal Awareness.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):429–455.
Similar books and articles
Colors and Reflectances.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 1997 - In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
On Qualia, Relations, and Structure in Color Experience.Stephen E. Palmer - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (6):976-985.
Transparency Vs. Revelation in Color Perception.John Campbell - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):105-115.
Perceived Colors and Perceived Locations: A Problem for Color Subjectivism.Peter W. Ross - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (2):125-138.
Projectivist Representationalism and Color.Wayne Wright - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (4):515-529.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads174 ( #25,089 of 2,152,501 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #281,161 of 2,152,501 )
How can I increase my downloads?