Dialectica 59 (1):51-61 (2005)
To the extent that indeterminacy intervenes between our reasons for action and our decisions, intentions and actions, our freedom seems to be reduced, not enhanced. Free will becomes nothing more than the power to choose irrationally. In recognition of this problem, some recent libertarians have suggested that free will is paradigmatically manifested only in actions for which we have reasons for both or all the alternatives. In these circumstances, however we choose, we choose rationally. Against this kind of account, most fully developed by Robert Kane, critics have pressed the demand for contrastive explanations. Kane has responded by arguing that the demand does not need to be met: responsibility for an action does not require that there be a contrastive explanation of that action. However, this response proves too much: it implies that agents are responsible not only for the actions they choose, but also for the counterfactual actions which were equally available to them
|Keywords||Action Contrast Explanation Free Will Metaphysics Reasons Kane, Robert|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance: Reflections on Free Will and Determinism.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-40.
Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274.
The Unhelpfulness of Determinism. [REVIEW]Galen Strawson - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):149-56.
Responses to Bernard Berofsky, John Martin Fischer and Galen Strawson. [REVIEW]Robert H. Kane - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):157-167.
Citations of this work BETA
Self-Forming Acts and the Grounds of Responsibility.John Lemos - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (1):135-146.
Wanting, Willing, Trying and Kane's Theory of Free Will.John Lemos - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (1):31-48.
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