Functionalism

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2008)
Abstract
Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only in the last third of the 20th century. Though the term ‘functionalism’ is used to designate a variety of positions in a variety of other disciplines, including psychology, sociology, economics, and architecture, this entry focuses exclusively on functionalism as a philosophical thesis about the nature of mental states
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Belief and Aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.
Kant’s Emergence and Sellarsian Cognitive Science.Richard McDonough - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):44-53.
Uploading and Branching Identity.Michael A. Cerullo - 2015 - Minds and Machines 25 (1):17-36.

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