Intentional chemistry

In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Amsterdam: Rodopi. pp. 103-134 (1993)
This paper discusses the debate between atomists and molecularists regarding the nature of mental content. A molecularist believes that some, but not all, of a mental symbol's inferential connections to other mental symbols, are at least partly constitutive of that symbol's intentional content. An atomist believes that none of the symbol's inferential connections play such a constitutive role. The paper is divided into two principal parts. First, attempts by Michael Devitt and Georges Rey to defend molecularism against traditional Quinean arguments are evaluated. The conclusion is that their attempts fall short of providing an adequate defense. Second, the prospects for an atomistic theory are investigated, building on the various remarks of Fodor and LePore in their book. Holism: A Shopper's Guide. It is argued that the prospects are better than at first they appear
Keywords Atomism  Holism  Mind  Fodor, J  Lepore, E
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DOI 10.5840/gps1993465
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A Naturalized Approach to the a Priori.Louise Antony - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):1–17.

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