Mind 129 (515):887-915 (2020)

Authors
Mark Alfano
Macquarie University
Neil Levy
Oxford University
Abstract
In the past two decades, epistemologists have significantly expanded the focus of their field. To the traditional question that has dominated the debate — under what conditions does belief amount to knowledge? — they have added questions about testimony, epistemic virtues and vices, epistemic trust, and more. This broadening of the range of epistemic concern has coincided with an expansion in conceptions of epistemic agency beyond the individualism characteristic of most earlier epistemology. We believe that these developments have not gone far enough. While the weak anti-individualism we see in contemporary epistemology may be adequate for the kinds of cases it tends to focus on, a great deal of human knowledge production and transmission does not conform to these models. Furthermore, the dispositions and norms that are knowledge-conducive in the familiar cases may not be knowledge-conducive generally. In fact, dispositions that, at an individual level, count as epistemic vices may be epistemic virtues in common social contexts. We argue that this overlooked feature of human social life means that epistemology must become more deeply and pervasively social.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/fzz017
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References found in this work BETA

The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
The Meaning of 'Meaning'.Hillary Putnam - 1975 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 7:131-193.
Individualism and the Mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.

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Citations of this work BETA

Vices of Other Minds: Review of Cassam’s Vices of the Mind.Mark Alfano - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):875-879.
Epistemic Complementarity: Steps to a Second-Wave Extended Epistemology.Gloria Andrada - forthcoming - In Robert W. Clowes, Klaus Gärtner & Inês Hipólito (eds.), The Mind-Technology Problem :Investigating Minds, Selves and 21st Century Artefacts. Springer Studies in Brain and Mind.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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