Luck and history‐sensitive compatibilism

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (235):237-251 (2009)
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Abstract

Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history‐sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history‐sensitive compatibilist's response to remote – constitutive – luck.

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Neil Levy
Macquarie University

Citations of this work

Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):302-324.
Lucky artists.Christopher Prodoehl - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
Responsibility, Luck, and Chance.Robert Kane - 1999 - Journal of Philosophy 96 (5):217-240.
Thinking about luck.E. J. Coffman - 2007 - Synthese 158 (3):385-398.
Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck*: ALFRED R. MELE.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):274-293.
Responsibility and Globally Manipulated Agents.Michael McKenna - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32 (1-2):169-192.

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