Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):289-297 (2008)
Many contemporary philosophers contend that a positive answer to Molyneux’s Question -- the question of whether a “man born blind and made to see” would be able to identify spatial figures, without touching them, on first viewing -- requires that there be a *rational connection* between the representations of those figures afforded by vision and by touch. This paper explores the question of what this could mean if the representations are non-discursive, or “pure recognitional” concepts, and argues that the most plausible answer to this question can be invoked to resolve analogous questions about the individuation of phenomenal concepts
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