European Journal of Philosophy 23 (2):248-272 (2015)
In this paper I argue against Brandom's two-ply theory of action. For Brandom, action is the result of an agent acknowledging a practical commitment and then causally responding to that commitment by acting. Action is social because the content of the commitment upon which one acts is socially conferred in the game of giving and asking for reasons. On my proposal, instead of seeing action as the coupling of a rational capacity to acknowledge commitments and a non-rational capacity to reliably respond to these commitments, we should see action as the coupling, or potential coupling, of a capacity to reason practically and a capacity to act on habits and bodily skills. In putting forward this alternative model of action, I aim to replace Brandom's rationalist brand of Pragmatism with a more classical kind, one that will let us see action as social not only at the level of reasons but also at the level of bodily habits and skills
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism.Robert Brandom - 2000 - Harvard University Press.
Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment.Robert B. Brandom - 1994 - Harvard University Press.
The Logic of Practice.Pierre Bourdieu - 1992 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35:447.
Citations of this work BETA
Second Nature and Historical Change in Hegel’s Philosophy of History.Simon Lumsden - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (1):74-94.
Similar books and articles
Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
The Causal and Deliberative Strength of Reasons for Action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2010 - In J. Aguilar & A. Buckareff (eds.), Causing Human Actions: New Perspectives on the Causal Theory of Action. Bradford.
Norms and Causes: Loosing the Bonds of Deontic Constraint.James Swindal - 2012 - Normative Functionalism and the Pittsburgh School.
Action, Norms, and Practical Reasoning.Robert Brandom - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):127-139.
The Meaning of Being is the Being of Meaning: On Heidegger’s Social Pragmatism.Eduardo Mendieta - 2007 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 33 (1):99-112.
Inferentialism and Communicative Action: Robust Conceptions of Intersubjectivity.Barbara Fultner - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):121 - 131.
Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality.Sabine Maasen, Wolfgang Prinz & Gerhard Roth (eds.) - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Robert Brandom on Communication, Reference, and Objectivity.Bernd Prien - 2010 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 18 (3):433-458.
Brandom on Two Problems of Conceptual Role Semantics.Gabor Forrai - 2009 - In Barbara Merker (ed.), Vertehen nach Heidegger und Brandom.
Added to index2012-05-05
Total downloads98 ( #51,893 of 2,168,922 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,816 of 2,168,922 )
How can I increase my downloads?