Australasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (4):400-411 (1987)

Authors
Janet Levin
University of Southern California
Abstract
In "the subjective view", Colin mcginn contends that a dispositional (or "subjectivist") account of secondary qualities may be incompatible with physicalism, As it provides special reasons to think that the experiences of secondary qualities cannot be reduced to physical or functional states. The primary aim of this paper is to show that such an account of secondary qualities is compatible with--Indeed, Encourages--A physico-Functional theory of experience. Further, It argues that if secondary quality experiences cannot be reduced to physical or functional states, Then the dispositional account of secondary qualities cannot hope to match the explanatory adequacy of a sophisticated reductionist view
Keywords Color  Epistemology  Physicalism  Secondary Quality  Subjectivity
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DOI 10.1080/00048408712343041
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