Phenomenal consciousness and the first-person

Psyche 7 (10) (2001)
Siewert's book revolves around three theses: that there is a distinctive style of epistemic warrant associated with the first-person point of view, that if we pay close attention to the deliverances of this first-person point of view, we will see that phenomenal consciousness is both real and yet neglected by many current theories that purport to explain consciousness, and that phenomenal consciousness is inherently intentional; one cannot divorce what phenomenal character presents to us from what it's like to have it. Among several points made on the relations among these three theses, it is argued that Siewert's argument for the distinctive status of first-person warrant does not provide him with the support necessary to employ that thesis in his defense of the significance of phenomenal consciousness
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Charles Peter Siewert (1994). Understanding Consciousness. Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Uriah Kriegel (2006). Theories of Consciousness. Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.

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