Permissive Rationality and Sensitivity

Abstract
Permissivism about rationality is the view that there is sometimes more than one rational response to a given body of evidence. In this paper I discuss the relationship between permissivism, deference to rationality, and peer disagreement. I begin by arguing that—contrary to popular opinion—permissivism supports at least a moderate version of conciliationism. I then formulate a worry for permissivism. I show that, given a plausible principle of rational deference, permissive rationality seems to become unstable and to collapse into unique rationality. I conclude with a formulation of a way out of this problem on behalf of the permissivist.
Keywords uniqueness  permissive rationality  disagreement
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Reprint years 2017
DOI 10.1111/phpr.12225
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References found in this work BETA
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Logical Foundations of Probability.Rudolf Carnap - 1950 - Chicago]University of Chicago Press.

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