Reasons and religious belief

This paper purports a limited study of the concept of reason. It analyzes the claim of religious belief to be reasonable. The context for this analysis is an examination of some evidential (criteriological) connections between reasonable belief and ?(good) reasons? for such belief. Consideration of the typical sort of evidential connection shows, not surprisingly, that religious belief cannot claim to be reasonable. But it is argued that there is (at least) one other sort of connection, and that it is philosophically plausible to regard this connection as definitive of a quite distinctive sense of ?reasonable?, with its own kind and style of criteria, according to which religious belief can be thought reasonable
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DOI 10.1080/00201746908601560
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References found in this work BETA
Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Harvard University Press.
Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The Way the World Is.Nelson Goodman - 1960 - Review of Metaphysics 14 (1):48 - 56.
Goodman on the Ravens.Sidney Morgenbesser - 1962 - Journal of Philosophy 59 (18):493-495.

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