Robinson on Berkeley: “Bad Faith” or Naive Idealism?
Abstract
Howard Robinson has argued that even if the major claims of Berkeleian idealism are mistaken, including its account of the “physical world,” “the overall endeavour of defending idealism is more plausible than it is generally believed to be”. He argues that aspects of Berkeley’s arguments for idealism, including a Berkeleian argument against naive realism, can be shown to refute the representative realist’s view of perception, and its concomitant ontology. This ontology is at least partially materialist. According to Robinson, once naive realism is disposed of and the objections to RR are exposed, Berkeleian Idealism can raise its shadowy head with at least the respectability afforded the currently more fashionable Representationalism. We shall argue that Robinson’s claim cannot plausibly be sustained. His defense of Berkeleian idealism, based in part on his understanding of naive realism and his critique of Representationalism, falters. “The overall endeavour of defending idealism” is not as plausible as Robinson takes it to be.