Regarding the Raven Paradox


Abstract
Reflecting the influence of both Bayesian and Popperian methodology, this paper presents an interpersonal view of confirmation which: (i) explains why a non-black non-raven may constitute evidence for and a black non-raven fails to constitute evidence for the hypothesis 'All ravens are black;' (ii) accounts for the common sense belief that black ravens confirm the raven hypothesis more than do non-black non-ravens; and (iii) applies to lawlike sentences understood as subjunctive conditionals as well as to accidental generalizations.
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