Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):899-913 (2020)

Authors
Neil Levy
Oxford University
Abstract
Moral judgments entail or consist in claims that certain ways of behaving are called for. These actions have expectable consequences. I will argue that these consequences are suspiciously benign: on controversial issues, each side assesses these consequences, measured in dispute-independent goods, as significantly better than the consequences of behaving in the ways their opponents recommend. This remains the case even when we have not formed our moral judgment by assessing consequences. I will suggest that the evidence indicates that our perception of the consequences of acting as recommended by our moral judgments is motivated, such that the warrant of such assessments is lower than we might have thought. The suspicion correlation between our moral judgments and our assessments of the implicated facts provides higher-order evidence that should lead us to reduce our confidence in these assessments.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10677-020-10116-w
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 54,491
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Reflection and Disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.
Epistemic Akrasia.Sophie Horowitz - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):718-744.
Epistemic Modesty Defended.David Christensen - 2013 - In David Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.

View all 21 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Against Mathematical Convenientism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Axiomathes 26 (2):115-122.
Listening to Clifford's Ghost.Peter van Inwagen - 2009 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 65:15-35.
Belief-in and Belief in God.John N. Williams - 1992 - Religious Studies 28 (3):401-405.
Why Believe?John Cottingham - 2009 - Continuum.
Chimpanzee Minds: Suspiciously Human?Daniel J. Povinelli & Jennifer Vonk - 2003 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):157-160.
Belief Revision.Hans Rott - 1995 - In Jonathan Eric Adler & Lance J. Rips (eds.), Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations. Cambridge University Press. pp. 514--534.
Genetic Pointillism Versus Physiological Form.Kenneth M. Weiss - 2018 - Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 61 (4):503-516.
Believing the Self-Contradictory.John N. Williams - 1982 - American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):279 - 285.
Does Belief (Only) Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
I—The Humean Thesis on Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2015 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 89 (1):143-185.
Ersatz Belief and Real Belief.Jerome Gellman - 2019 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 6 (1):39-53.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2020-08-21

Total views
10 ( #826,576 of 2,381,226 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #67,375 of 2,381,226 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes