The Failure of Hooker’s Argument for Rule Consequentialism

Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (5):598-614 (2014)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Brad Hooker argues for rule consequentialism using narrow reflective equilibrium resources along with a handful of wider resources. One of his important claims in defense of rule consequentialism is that it begins from a familiar and attractive idea about morality. I argue that his defense of rule consequentialism fails and more particularly, that rather than beginning from a familiar and attractive idea, it begins from an idea that is quite unattractive. I show this by applying the method rule consequentialists use to derive moral advice for the real world to non-moral cases where its unattractiveness is clear. I then argue that the basic idea behind rule consequentialism is attractive if considered as an account of moral reform, in so far as the account of moral reform can be divorced from one’s account of right and wrong, something that occurs in theories like that of Stephen Toulmin.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 90,221

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

A Contractualist Defense of Rule Consequentialism.Sanford Levy - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:189-201.
Is Rule-Consequentialism a Rubber Duck?Brad Hooker - 1994 - Analysis 54 (2):92 - 97.
Rule-consequentialism's dilemma.Iain Law - 1999 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2 (3):263-276.
Rule-consequentialism and obligations toward the needy.Brad Hooker - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):19–33.
Variable versus fixed-rate rule-utilitarianism.Brad Hooker & Guy Fletcher - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):344–352.
Rule Consequentialism and Scope.Leonard Kahn - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):631-646.
Rule consequentialism and disasters.Leonard Kahn - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-01-23

Downloads
55 (#258,576)

6 months
1 (#1,028,709)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references