Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):221-229 (2013)
A number of philosophers have recently argued that agents need not be conscious of the reasons for which they act or the moral significance of their actions in order to be morally responsible for them. In this paper, I identify a kind of awareness that, I claim, agents must have in order to be responsible for their actions. I argue that conscious information processing differs from unconscious in a manner that makes the following two claims true: (1) an agent’s values ought to be identified with attitudes of which she is conscious, because having a value entails having a set of dispositions produced by conscious attitudes alone, and (2) that only actions settled upon by conscious deliberation are deeply attributable to agents, because only such actions express the agent’s evaluative stance
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Citations of this work BETA
Corporate Crocodile Tears? On the Reactive Attitudes of Corporate Agents.Gunnar Björnsson & Kendy Hess - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):273–298.
Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.
Verbal Reports and ‘Real’ Reasons: Confabulation and Conflation.Constantine Sandis - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):267-280.
When Manipulation Gets Personal.Vishnu Sridharan - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):464-478.
The Value and Disvalue of Consciousness.Walter Glannon - 2016 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 25 (4):600-612.
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