The modal status of materialism

Philosophical Studies 145 (3):351 - 362 (2009)

Authors
Kelly Trogdon
Virginia Tech
Joseph Levine
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Abstract
Argument that Lewis and others are wrong that physicalism is if true then contingently true.
Keywords Materialism  Brute necessity  Realization  Dispositions
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-008-9235-z
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References found in this work BETA

New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Problem of Extras and the Contingency of Physicalism.Robert Francescotti - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):241-254.
Physicalism and Moorean Supervenience.Thomas W. Polger - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (1):72-92.
Conceptual Mastery and the Knowledge Argument.Gabriel Rabin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):125-147.

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