Public Health Ethics 12 (2):103-113 (2019)

Neil Levy
Oxford University
Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts.
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DOI 10.1093/phe/phz001
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References found in this work BETA

What Do Philosophers Believe?David Bourget & David J. Chalmers - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):465-500.
Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (1):5-20.
Responsibility From the Margins.David Shoemaker - 2015 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Applying Brown and Savulescu: The Diachronic Condition as Excuse.Neil Levy - 2019 - Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (10):646-647.
Justice, Inequality, and Health.Gopal Sreenivasan - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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