The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox

Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158 (2009)
Abstract
The Surprise Exam Paradox continues to perplex and torment despite the many solutions that have been offered. This paper proposes to end the intrigue once and for all by refuting one of the central pillars of the Surprise Exam Paradox, the 'No Friday Argument,' which concludes that an exam given on the last day of the testing period cannot be a surprise. This refutation consists of three arguments, all of which are borrowed from the literature: the 'Unprojectible Announcement Argument,' the 'Wright & Sudbury Argument,' and the 'Epistemic Blindspot Argument.' The reason that the Surprise Exam Paradox has persisted this long is not because any of these arguments is problematic. On the contrary, each of them is correct. The reason that it has persisted so long is because each argument is only part of the solution. The correct solution requires all three of them to be combined together. Once they are, we may see exactly why the No Friday Argument fails and therefore why we have a solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox that should stick.
Keywords surprise  paradox  blindspot  justified belief  certainty  intuition  backward induction  liar  Moore  Sorensen
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.2041-6962.2009.tb00088.x
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 25,751
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Belief.Jaakko Hintikka - 1962 - Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Outline of a Theory of Truth.Saul A. Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Blindspots.Roy A. Sorensen - 1988 - Oxford University Press.
The Semantic Conception of Truth: And the Foundations of Semantics.Alfred Tarski - 1943 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 4 (3):341-376.

View all 88 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
On a so‐Called Solution to a Paradox.Michael Veber - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1).
On a so‐Called Solution to a Paradox.Michael Veber - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):283-297.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2009-07-19

Total downloads

110 ( #42,443 of 2,146,803 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

4 ( #185,115 of 2,146,803 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums