Taking type-b materialism seriously

Mind and Language 23 (4):402-425 (2008)
Authors
Janet Levin
University of Southern California
Abstract
Abstract:  Type-B materialism is the thesis that though phenomenal states are necessarily identical with physical states, phenomenal concepts have no a priori connections to physical or functional concepts. Though type-B materialists have invoked this conceptual independence to counter a number of well-known arguments against physicalism (e.g. the conceivability of zombies, the ignorance of Mary, the existence of an 'explanatory gap'), anti-physicalists have raised objections to this strategy. My aim here is to defend type-B materialism against these objections, by arguing that they share the common problem of not taking the central features of the view sufficiently seriously. However, I will end by noting that type-B materialism raises other questions, and suggesting that what stands in the way of an adequate naturalistic account of phenomenal states may be the propensity to take type-B materialism more seriously than it deserves.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00349.x
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?David J. Chalmers - 2002 - In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 145--200.
A Theory of the A Priori.George Bealer - 2000 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (1):1-30.
Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Sense of Incredibility in Ethics.N. G. Laskowski - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-23.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.

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