The universalizability of moral judgments revisited

Mind 88 (349):115-119 (1979)
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Abstract

The question is not whether the word "ought" means what hare says; the question is whether the concept of objectivity can be applied to practical judgments. Universalizability is the key, According to the kantian, And that's why the universalizability of moral judgments is conceptually important. As a preliminary to arguing this, I show that some common counterexamples to hare's thesis misfire--And I end by suggesting that it is no a priori truth that every speaker and every culture have morality

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