Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):397–410 (2004)
One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of "explains" or "arises from" which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.
|Keywords||belief, epistemology, gettier cases, motive, truth|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):140-155.
Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.
Agency Ascriptions in Ethics and Epistemology: Or, Navigating Intersections, Narrow and Broad.Guy Axtell - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (1):73-94.
Similar books and articles
Virtue -Based Epistemology and the Centrality of Truth (Towards a Strong Virtue-Epistemology).Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):239--266.
Combating Anti Anti-Luck Epistemology.B. J. C. Madison - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):47-58.
Accidentally Factive Mental States.Baron Reed - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):134–142.
Epistemology, Realism, and Truth: The First Philosophical Perspectives Lecture.Ernest Sosa - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7 (1):1-16.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads50 ( #105,040 of 2,172,876 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #117,033 of 2,172,876 )
How can I increase my downloads?