Virtue epistemology: No new cures

Abstract
One version of virtue epistemology defines knowledge as belief whose truth arises from, or is explained by, the motives that produced it. This version is also intended to solve the Gettier problem, by shielding properly caused beliefs from double accidents. Unfortunately, there is no notion of "explains" or "arises from" which explains in the intended sense the truth of true beliefs.
Keywords belief, epistemology, gettier cases, motive, truth
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DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2004.tb00401.x
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Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2):140-155.
Robust Virtue Epistemology As Anti‐Luck Epistemology: A New Solution.J. Adam Carter - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):140-155.

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