Virtue signalling is virtuous

Synthese 198 (10):9545-9562 (2020)
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Abstract

The accusation of virtue signalling is typically understood as a serious charge. Those accused usually respond by attempting to show that they are doing no such thing. In this paper, I argue that we ought to embrace the charge, rather than angrily reject it. I argue that this response can draw support from cognitive science, on the one hand, and from social epistemology on the other. I claim that we may appropriately concede that what we are doing is virtue signalling, because virtue signalling is morally appropriate. It neither expresses vices, nor is hypocritical, nor does it degrade the quality of public moral discourse. Signalling our commitment to norms is a central and justifiable function of moral discourse, and the same signals provide evidence that is appropriately taken into account in forming moral beliefs.

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Neil Levy
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Virtue Signaling and Moral Progress.Evan Westra - 2021 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 49 (2):156-178.
Intellectual Virtue Signaling.Neil Levy - 2023 - American Philosophical Quarterly 60 (3):311-324.
Bad Language Makes Good Politics.Adam F. Gibbons - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
Indeterminacy and impotence.Benjamin Hale - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-24.
Against moral judgment. The empirical case for moral abolitionism.Hanno Sauer - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):137-154.

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References found in this work

Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.
Testimony: a philosophical study.C. A. J. Coady - 1992 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
Epistemology of disagreement : the good news.David Christensen - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.

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