Why cognitivism?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (2):223-244 (2018)

Authors
Yair Levy
Tel Aviv University
Abstract
Intention Cognitivism – the doctrine that intending to V entails, or even consists in, believing that one will V – is an important position with potentially wide-ranging implications, such as a revisionary understanding of practical reason, and a vindicating explanation of 'Practical Knowledge'. In this paper, I critically examine the standard arguments adduced in support of IC, including arguments from the parity of expression of intention and belief; from the ability to plan around one's intention; and from the explanation provided by the thesis for our knowledge of our intentional acts. I conclude that none of these arguments are compelling, and therefore that no good reason has been given to accept IC.
Keywords Intention  Cognitivism about Intention  Practical Knowledge  Avowals
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Reprint years 2017, 2018
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2017.1345207
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References found in this work BETA

Studies in the Way of Words.H. P. Grice - 1989 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Why Be Rational.Niko Kolodny - 2005 - Mind 114 (455):509-563.

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Citations of this work BETA

The Subjective Authority of Intention.Lilian O’Brien - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (275):354-373.

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