Why Rational Agents Should Not Be Liberal Maximizers

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (S1):1-17 (2008)
Abstract
Hans Herzberger's 1973 essay 'Ordinal Preference and Rational Choice' is a classic milestone in the erosion of the idea that rational agents are maximizers of utility. By the time Herzberger wrote, many authors had replaced this claim with the thesis that rational agents are maximizers of preference. That is to say, it was assumed that at the moment of choice a rational agent has a weak ordering representing his or her preferences among the options available to the agent for choice and that the rational agent restricts choice to one of the optimal options. Such an option is an available option judged at least as good as any other.Herzberger explored the prospects of weakening this ordinalist view of maximizing ..
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DOI 10.1353/cjp.2011.0032
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On Indeterminate Probabilities.Isaac Levi - 1974 - Journal of Philosophy 71 (13):391-418.

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