An Argument for the Identity Theory
Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25 (1966)
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ISBN(s)
0022-362X
DOI
10.2307/2024524
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Citations of this work
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality.Alison Gopnik - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):1-14.
Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.
