Accuracy, Conditionalization, and Probabilism

Authors
Don Fallis
Northeastern University
Peter J. Lewis
Dartmouth College
Abstract
Accuracy-based arguments for conditionalization and probabilism appear to have a significant advantage over their Dutch Book rivals. They rely only on the plausible epistemic norm that one should try to decrease the inaccuracy of one's beliefs. Furthermore, it seems that conditionalization and probabilism follow from a wide range of measures of inaccuracy. However, we argue that among the measures in the literature, there are some from which one can prove conditionalization, others from which one can prove probabilism, and none from which one can prove both. Hence at present, the accuracy-based approach cannot underwrite both conditionalization and probabilism.
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