Philosophy 88 (4):527-553 (2013)

Patrick Lewtas
American University of Beirut
Most definitions of radical emergentism characterize it epistemologically. This leads to misunderstandings and makes it hard to assess the doctrine's metaphysical worth. This paper puts forward purely metaphysical characterizations of emergentism and property emergence. It explores the nature of the necessitation relation between base and emergent and argues that emergentism entails a Humean account of causation and related relations. Then it presents arguments against emergentism, both as a wider metaphysic and as an account of consciousness. These maintain that emergentism makes implausible claims about how the world works. The paper also stresses the doctrine's contemporary relevance: most current property dualists endorse views effectively identical to classical emergentism less its historical commitment to novel emergent forces
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DOI 10.1017/S0031819113000508
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Sensations and Brain Processes.Jjc Smart - 1959 - Philosophical Review 68 (April):141-56.
Making Sense of Emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.
Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?Colin McGinn - 1989 - Mind 98 (July):349-66.

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Citations of this work BETA

Building Minds: Solving the Combination Problem.Pat Lewtas - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):742-781.
When is a Concrete Property Basic?Pat Lewtas - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):607-622.
The Irrationality of Physicalism.Pat Lewtas - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (3):313-341.

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