Forget about the ‘correspondence theory of truth’

Analysis 61 (272):275–280 (2001)
There is no distinct correspondence theory of truth, truth is correspondence to fact. If facts are taken to be true propositions, we wind up with just another version of the correspondence theory's ostensible competitor, the redundancy theory of truth. If instead facts are taken to be Armstrong's states of affairs, or Tractarian facts, or Mellor's _facta, we get a _truthmaker principle, that for every truth there is a truthmaker; something whose existence implies the proposition in question. Truthmaker principles are interesting and useful, but go far beyond truth as correspondence with fact, and so are not really theories of truth at all
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DOI 10.1111/1467-8284.00305
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Jamin Asay (2013). Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
Craig Bourne (2006). A Theory of Presentism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):1-23.

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