Gratitude and believing in someone

Philosophical Issues 34 (1):96-113 (2024)
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Abstract

I aim to vindicate the claim that we can owe someone gratitude for believing in us and to show how this seemingly prosaic fact has important upshots for the normativity of gratitude. I start by sketching a novel account of what it is to believe in someone according to which it consists in holding an affective attitude of confident optimism toward their general ability in some domain(s). I then argue that people can deserve gratitude for holding this attitude. I close by showing how the possibility of being gratitudeworthy for believing in someone casts down on three commonplaces about when gratitude is owed.

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edition Lewis, Max (2024) "Gratitude: Its Nature and Normativity". Philosophy Compass 19(8):e13015

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Max Lewis
Yale University

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References found in this work

Trust as an affective attitude.Karen Jones - 1996 - Ethics 107 (1):4-25.
Epistemic partiality in friendship.Sarah Stroud - 2006 - Ethics 116 (3):498-524.
There is no such thing as doxastic wrongdoing.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - forthcoming - Philosophical Perspectives.
Moral Principles and Political Obligations.A. John Simmons - 1980 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 87 (4):568-568.

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