Synthese 195 (4):1667-1679 (2018)

Authors
Lukas Lewerentz
Oxford University
Benjamin Marschall
Cambridge University (PhD)
Abstract
According to intentionalism, a demonstrative d refers to an object o only if the speaker intends d to refer to o. Intentionalism is a popular view in metasemantics, but Gauker has recently argued that it is circular. We defend intentionalism against this objection, by showing that Gauker’s argument rests on a misconstrual of the aim of metasemantics. We then introduce two related, but distinct circularity objections: the worry that intentionalism is uninformative, and the problem of intentional bootstrapping, according to which it is impossible to have referential intentions. We also show how intentionalists could respond to these new objections.
Keywords metasemantics  demonstratives  referential intentions  circularity
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DOI 10.1007/s11229-016-1290-y
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References found in this work BETA

Afterthoughts.David Kaplan - 1989 - In J. Almog, J. Perry & H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 565-614.
Speaker Intentions in Context.Jeffrey C. King - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):219-237.
The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning.Kenneth W. Kemp - 1988 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 24 (1):76-80.
The Metasemantics of Contextual Sensitivity.Jeffrey C. King - 2014 - In Brett Sherman & Alexis Burgess (eds.), Metasemantics: New Essays on the Foundations of Meaning. Oxford University Press. pp. 97-118.

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Citations of this work BETA

Ways of Using Words: On Semantic Intentions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):93-117.
Against the Speaker-Intention Theory of Demonstratives.Christopher Gauker - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (2):109-129.

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