On the Plurality of Worlds

Wiley-Blackwell (1986)

Authors
David K. Lewis
Harvard University (PhD)
Abstract
This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true
Keywords Plurality of worlds  Modality (Theory of knowledge  Realism
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Reprint years 2001
Buy the book $109.56 used    Amazon page
Call number BD655.L48 2001
ISBN(s) 9780631224969   0631139931   9780631224266
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On What Grounds What.Jonathan Schaffer - 2009 - In David Manley, David J. Chalmers & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 347-383.

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