Realism and the strong program

Abstract
The four tenets of the Strong Program are compatible with a scientific realism founded on an externalist epistemology. Such an epistemology allows that appropriate norms of rationality may differ from time to time, and from community to community, and thereby enables the realist to embrace strong forms of the ‘symmetry principle’. It also suggests a fruitful collaborative research program in externalist social epistemology. Some of what the Edinburgh School says about truth can also be accepted. But the realist should reject the School's argument for the claim that there is no distinction between being rational and being locally accepted as rational, which seems to rest on a kind of epistemological internalism. Introducing the Strong Program Realism and the four tenets A stronger reading of symmetry Conflict and cooperation A note on discovery and justification Relativism and realism Truth Points of contention: the restriction of explanatory contrasts Points of contention: standards of rationality.
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DOI 10.1093/bjps/axi125
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Realism, Reliabilism, and the 'Strong Programme' in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge.Jeff Kochan - 2008 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 22 (1):21 – 38.
State of the Field: Are the Results of Science Contingent or Inevitable?Katherina Kinzel - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 52:55-66.
The Darwinian View of Culture.Tim Lewens - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):745-753.
Science, Truth and History, Part II. Metaphysical Bolt-Holes for the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge?Nick Tosh - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1):185-209.

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