Russellian Panpsychism: Too Good to Be True?

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):57-72 (2015)

Authors
Patrick Lewtas
American University of Beirut
Abstract
Russellian panpsychism puts basic conscious properties at the bottom level and then grounds lowestlevel physical entities in them. This paper offers arguments against the view. The explanatory gap cuts both ways, making it as hard to get the physical out of consciousness as to get consciousness out of the physical. Russellian panpsychism can't explain how basic conscious properties yield high-level consciousness. Other non-physicalist views can evade the causal argument for physicalism at least as well as Russellian panpsychism. Simplicity and beauty don't supply reasons for Russellian panpsychism.
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References found in this work BETA

Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
A World of States of Affairs.D. M. Armstrong - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Building Minds: Solving the Combination Problem.Pat Lewtas - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):742-781.
The Impossibility of Emergent Conscious Causal Powers.Pat Lewtas - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):475-487.
The Irrationality of Physicalism.Pat Lewtas - 2014 - Axiomathes 24 (3):313-341.

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