Relationality without obligation

Analysis 82 (2):238-246 (2022)
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Abstract

Some reasons are thought to depend on relations between people, such as that of a promiser to a promisee. It has sometimes been assumed that all reasons that are relational in this way are moral obligations. I argue, via a counter example, that there are non-obligatory relational reasons. If true, this has ramifications for relational theories of morality.

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James H. P. Lewis
University of Birmingham

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References found in this work

The Limits of Self-Awareness.Michael G. F. Martin - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 120 (1-3):37-89.
The Moral Nexus.R. Jay Wallace - 2019 - Princeton University Press.
Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.

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