The Doomsday Argument and the Simulation Argument

Authors
Peter J. Lewis
Dartmouth College
Abstract
The Simulation Argument and the Doomsday Argument share certain structural similarities, and hence are often discussed together. Both are cases where reflecting on one’s location among a set of possibilities yields a counter-intuitive conclusion—in one case that the end of humankind is closer than you initially thought, and in the second case that it is more likely than you initially thought that you are living in a computer simulation. Indeed, the two arguments do share strong structural similarities. But there are also some disanalogies between the two arguments, and I argue that these disanalogies mean that the Simulation Argument succeeds and the Doomsday Argument fails.
Keywords Doomsday argument  Simulation argument  Self-locating belief
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1007/s11229-013-0245-9
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The Doomsday Argument and the Number of Possible Observers.Ken D. Olum - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (207):164-184.

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