A defense of intuitions

Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262 (2008)
Abstract
Radical experimentalists argue that we should give up using intuitions as evidence in philosophy. In this paper, I first argue that the studies presented by the radical experimentalists in fact suggest that some intuitions are reliable. I next consider and reject a different way of handling the radical experimentalists' challenge, what I call the Argument from Robust Intuitions. I then propose a way of understanding why some intuitions can be unreliable and how intuitions can conflict, and I argue that on this understanding, both moderate experimentalism and the standard philosophical practice of using intuitions as evidence can help resolve these conflicts
Keywords Intuitions  Experimental philosophy  Experimentalism  Intuitionism  Empirical psychology
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-007-9140-x
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References found in this work BETA
Theory of Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 2000 - Westview Press.
Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin I. Goldman - 1986 - Harvard University Press.
Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?Edmund Gettier - 1963 - Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.

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Citations of this work BETA
Experimental Attacks on Intuitions and Answers.John Bengson - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):495-532.

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