Are 'ex Ante' enhancements always permissible?

American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):23 – 25 (2005)
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Abstract

Frances Kamm distinguishes between changes or enhancements that are made before a child exists (ex ante changes) and those that are made once a child exists (ex post changes), and she argues that ex ante changes do not show disrespect or, as Michael Sandel would put it, lack of love, for a person, since the person does not yet exist. In this paper, I argue that it is important to distinguish between ex ante enhancements that are morally neutral and those that are morally dubious, and that the latter ones are morally objectionable even if the persons do not yet exist.

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S. Matthew Liao
New York University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
The Case Against Perfection.Michael J. Sandel - 2004 - The Atlantic (April):1–11.
Who Can Be Wronged?Rahul Kumar - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (2):99-118.
Is there a problem with enhancement?Frances M. Kamm - 2005 - American Journal of Bioethics 5 (3):5 – 14.

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