Ratio 27 (1):17-31 (2014)
Two lines of investigation into the nature of mental content have proceeded in parallel until now. The first looks at thoughts that are attributable to collectives, such as bands' beliefs and teams' desires. So far, philosophers who have written on collective belief, collective intentionality, etc. have primarily focused on third-personal attributions of thoughts to collectives. The second looks at de se, or self-locating, thoughts, such as beliefs and desires that are essentially about oneself. So far, philosophers who have written on the de se have primarily focused on de se thoughts of individuals. This paper looks at where these two lines of investigations intersect: collective de se thoughts, such as bands' and teams' beliefs and desires that are essentially about themselves. There is a surprising problem at this intersection: the most prominent framework for modeling de se thoughts, the framework of centered worlds, cannot model a special class of collective de se thoughts. A brief survey of this problem's solution space shows that collective de se thoughts pose a new challenge for modeling mental content
|Keywords||de se self-location centered worlds David Lewis mental content collective belief collective intentionality collective mentality|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
From Moral Agency to Collective Wrongs: Re-Thinking Collective Moral Responsibility.Marion Smiley - 2010 - Journal of Law and Policy (1):171-202.
Collective Intentionality, Evolutionary Biology and Social Reality.Jack J. Vromen - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (3):251-265.
Do You See What We See? An Investigation of an Argument Against Collective Representation.Bryce Huebner - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):91 – 112.
Is There Collective Scientific Knowledge? Arguments From Explanation.Melinda Bonnie Fagan - 2011 - Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):247-269.
Collective Guilt and Collective Guilt Feelings.Margaret Gilbert - 2002 - Journal of Ethics 6 (2):115-143.
Collective Obligations: Their Existence, Their Explanatory Power, and Their Supervenience on the Obligations of Individuals.Bill Wringe - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):472-497.
The Feasibility of Collectives' Actions.Holly Lawford-Smith - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):453-467.
Explaining Economic Crises: Are There Collective Representations?Paul Thagard - 2010 - Episteme 7 (3):266-283.
Unintentional Collective Action.Sara Rachel Chant - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):245 – 256.
Added to index2013-08-09
Total downloads379 ( #6,912 of 2,168,154 )
Recent downloads (6 months)16 ( #20,211 of 2,168,154 )
How can I increase my downloads?