Authors
Tamar Gendler
Yale University
Shen-yi Liao
University of Puget Sound
Abstract
To imagine is to form a mental representation that does not aim at things as they actually, presently, and subjectively are. One can use imagination to represent possibilities other than the actual, to represent times other than the present, and to represent perspectives other than one’s own. Unlike perceiving and believing, imagining something does not require one to consider that something to be the case. Unlike desiring or anticipating, imagining something does not require one to wish or expect that something to be the case. // Imagination is involved in a wide variety of human activities, and has been explored from a wide range of philosophical perspectives. Philosophers of mind have examined imagination’s role in mindreading and in pretense. Philosophical aestheticians have examined imagination’s role in creating and in engaging with different types of artworks. Epistemologists have examined imagination’s role in theoretical thought experiments and in practical decision-making. Philosophers of language have examined imagination’s role in irony and metaphor. // Because of the breadth of the topic, this entry focuses exclusively on contemporary discussions of imagination in the Anglo-American philosophical tradition.
Keywords imagination  supposition  imagery  pretense  mindreading  memory  belief  memory  knowledge
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References found in this work BETA

Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
Transformative Experience.L. A. Paul - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
Alief and Belief.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (10):634-663.

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Citations of this work BETA

Imagining in Response to Fiction: Unpacking the Infrastructure.Alon Chasid - 2019 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (1):31-48.
Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science.Michael T. Stuart - 2017 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (49):9-32.
The imagination model of implicit bias.Anna Welpinghus - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1611-1633.
Defending Discontinuism, Naturally.Sarah Robins - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):469-486.
Social Robots, Fiction, and Sentimentality.Raffaele Rodogno - 2016 - Ethics and Information Technology 18 (4):257-268.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

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