Are Intrinsic Properties Independent of Accompaniment?

Journal of Human Cognition 5 (1):20-37 (2021)
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Abstract

A combinatorial analysis of intrinsicality takes intrinsic properties to be independent of accompaniment: a property is intrinsic only if it is possible for a lonely or an accompanied thing to have it or lack it (I). Cameron argues that the combinatorial analysis in Langton & Lewis (1998) faces an epistemic circularity, which makes (I) suspicious. In this paper, I examine two approaches to free the combinatorial analyses from the circularity and find them all fail. Then I provide an outline of an argument for (I) by appealing to the grounding analyses of intrinsicality, which shows an advantage of the grounding analyses over the combinatorial ones.

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Xiao Li
Tsinghua University

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