Ratio 23 (1):59-72 (2010)

Authors
S. Matthew Liao
New York University
Abstract
In explicating his version of the Organism View, Eric Olson argues that you begin to exist only after twinning is no longer possible and that you cannot survive a process of inorganic replacement. Assuming the correctness of the Organism View, but pace Olson, I argue in this paper that the Organism View does not require that you believe either proposition. The claim I shall make about twinning helps to advance a debate that currently divides defenders of the Organism View, while the claim I shall make about inorganic replacement will help to put the Organism View on a par with its rival views by allowing it to accommodate a plausible intuition that its rivals can accommodate, namely, the intuition that you can survive a process of inorganic replacement. Both claims, I shall also argue, are important for those who are interested in the identity condition of a human organism, even if they do not hold the view that you are essentially an organism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2009.00450.x
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Generic Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (8):405-429.
Animalism.Andrew M. Bailey - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (12):867-883.
Prosthetic embodiment.Sean Aas - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6509-6532.

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