The experimental evidence for subjective referral of a sensory experience backwards in time: Reply to P.s. Churchland

Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197 (1981)
Evidence that led to the hypothesis of a backwards referral of conscious sensory experiences in time, and the experimental tests of its predictions, is summarized. Criticisms of the data and the conclusion by Churchland that this hypothesis is untenable are analysed and found to be based upon misconceptions and faulty evaluations of facts and theory. Subjective referral in time violates no neurophysiological principles or data and is compatible with the theory of "mental" and "physical" correspondence
Keywords Experience  Metaphysics  Stimulus  Time  Churchland, P
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DOI 10.1086/288990
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Max Velmans (1991). Is Human Information Processing Conscious? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Ned Block (1991). Evidence Against Epiphenomenalism. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):670-672.
Max Velmans (1991). Consciousness From a First-Person Perspective. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):702-726.

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