Are beliefs the proper targets of adaptationist analyses?

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):528 (2009)

Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University
McKay & Dennett's (M&D's) description of beliefs, and misbeliefs in particular, is a commendable contribution to the literature; but we argue that referring to beliefs as adaptive or maladaptive can cause conceptual confusion. is inconsistently defined in the article, which adds to confusion and renders it difficult to evaluate the claims, particularly the possibility of
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09991294
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 47,395
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Economy of Nature and the Evolution of Sex.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1976 - Journal of the History of Biology 9 (2):324-324.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Adaptationism, Culture, and the Malleability of Human Nature.Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2008 - In Peter Caruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind, Volume 3. Oxford University Press.
Some Questions About Proper Basicality.James G. Hanink - 1987 - Faith and Philosophy 4 (1):13-25.
Basing Beliefs on Reasons.Joseph Tolliver - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 15 (1):149-161.
Winner-Takes-All and Action Selection.Daniel V. Meegan - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (4):692-693.
The Potential Information Analysis of Seeing.Scott Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):102–123.


Added to PP index

Total views
22 ( #430,538 of 2,291,331 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #827,672 of 2,291,331 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes

Sign in to use this feature