Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):232-242 (2011)

Authors
David Liebesman
University of Calgary
Abstract
David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01395.x
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications.David K. Lewis - 1972 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (3):249-258.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Metaphysical Causation.Alastair Wilson - 2018 - Noûs 52 (4):723-751.
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.

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