Causation and the canberra plan

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):232-242 (2011)
Abstract
David Lewis has a general recipe for analysis: the Canberra Plan. His analyses of mind, color, and value all proceed according to the plan. What is curious is that his analysis of causation – one of his seminal analyses – doesn't. It doesn't and according to Lewis it can't. Lewis has two objections against using the Canberra Plan to analyze causation. After presenting Lewis' objections I argue that they both fail. I then draw some lessons from their failure
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2011.01395.x
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References found in this work BETA
Parts of Classes.David Lewis - 1991 - Blackwell.
Philosophical Papers.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David Lewis - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Papers in Metaphysics and Epistemology.David K. Lewis - 1999 - Cambridge: Uk ;Cambridge University Press.
An Argument for the Identity Theory.David Lewis - 1970 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (2):17-25.

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Citations of this work BETA
Concepts, Analysis, Generics and the Canberra Plan1.Mark Johnston & Sarah-Jane Leslie - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):113-171.

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